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ABSTRACT
Sophisticated malware authors can sneak hidden malicious
contents into portable executable files, and these contents
can be hard to detect, especially if encrypted or compressed.
However, when an executable file switches between con-
tent regimes (e.g., native, encrypted, compressed, text, and
padding), there are corresponding shifts in the file’s repre-
sentation as an entropy signal. In this paper, we develop
a method for automatically quantifying the extent to which
patterned variations in a file’s entropy signal make it “suspi-
cious." In Experiment 1, we use wavelet transforms to define
a Suspiciously Structured Entropic Change Score (SSECS),
a scalar feature that quantifies the suspiciousness of a file
based on its distribution of entropic energy across multiple
levels of spatial resolution. Based on this single feature, it
was possible to raise predictive accuracy on a malware de-
tection task from 50.0% to 68.7%, even though the single
feature was applied to a heterogeneous corpus of malware
discovered “in the wild." In Experiment 2, we describe how
wavelet-based decompositions of software entropy can be ap-
plied to a parasitic malware detection task involving large
numbers of samples and features. By extracting only string
and entropy features (with wavelet decompositions) from
software samples, we are able to obtain almost 99% detection
of parasitic malware with fewer than 1% false positives on
good files. Moreover, the addition of wavelet-based features
uniformly improved detection performance across plausible
false positive rates, both in a strings-only model (e.g., from
80.90% to 82.97%) and a strings-plus-entropy model (e.g.
from 92.10% to 94.74%, and from 98.63% to 98.90%). Over-
all, wavelet decomposition of software entropy can be useful
for machine learning models for detecting malware based on
extracting millions of features from executable files.1
KEYWORDS: wavelet decomposition, structural entropy,
malware detection, parasitic malware, machine learning
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Entropy Of Malicious Software
A fundamental goal in the information security industry is
malware detection. In this paper, we focus our malware
detection efforts on the fact that malicious files (e.g. para-
sitics, or exploits with injected shellcode) commonly contain
encrypted or compressed (“packed”) segments which conceal
1This article is a post-print of [18] which corrects typos in-
troduced during editing.
malicious contents [3]. Thus, the information security indus-
try has been interested in developing methodologies which
can automatically detect the presence of encrypted or com-
pressed segments hidden within portable executable files. To
this end, entropy analysis has been used, because files with
high entropy are relatively likely to have encrypted or com-
pressed sections inside them [5]. In general, the entropy of a
random variable reflects the amount of uncertainty (or lack
of knowledge) about that variable. In the context of software
analysis, zero entropy would mean that the same character
was repeated over and over (as might occur in a “padded”
chunk of code), and maximum entropy would mean that a
chunk consisted of entirely distinct values. Thus, chunks
of code that have been compressed or encrypted tend to
have higher entropy than native code. For instance, in the
software corpus studied by [5], plain text had an average
entropy of 4.34, native executables had an average entropy
of 5.09, packed executables had an average entropy of 6.80,
and encrypted executables had an average entropy of 7.17.
1.2 Suspiciously Structured Entropy
Based on the reasoning above, previous research has used
high mean entropy as an indicator of encryption or com-
pression. However, malicious contents, when concealed in
a sophisticated manner, may not be detectable through
simple entropy statistics, such as mean file entropy. Mal-
ware writers sometimes try to conceal hidden encrypted
or compressed code that they introduce in creating files
such as parasitic malware; for instance, they may add ad-
ditional padding (zero entropy chunks), so that the file
passes through high entropy filters. However, files with con-
cealed encrypted or compressed segments tend to vacillate
markedly between native code, encrypted and compressed
segments, and padding, with each segment having distinct
and characteristic expected entropy levels. Thus, the field of
cybersecurity has started to pay attention to files with highly
structured entropy [11], [2], that is, files whose code flips be-
tween various distinguishing levels of entropy through the
file.
In order to automatically identify the degree of entropic
structure within a piece of software, we represent each
portable executable file as an “entropy stream.” The entropy
stream describes the amount of entropy over a small snippet
of code in a certain location of the file. The “amount” of
entropic structure can then be quantified, such that we can
differentiate, for example, between a low-structured signal
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with a single local mean and variation around that mean,
versus a highly-structured signal whose local mean changes
many times over the course of the file.
In this paper2, we define suspiciously structured entropy as a
particular pattern of entropic structure which matches those
of malicious files. To quantify the suspiciousness of the
structured entropy within a piece of software, we develop
the notion of a “Suspiciously Structured Entropic Change
Score” (SSECS). We first describe how to calculate SSECS
as a single predictive feature, and analyze its performance
in malware detection. We then generalize this feature to
large-scale malware detection tasks. The derivation of the
SSECS feature depends upon the notion of a wavelet trans-
form, which we now briefly review.
1.3 Brief Overview Of Wavelets
The Wavelet Transform is the primary mathematical oper-
ator underlying our quantification of structurally suspicious
entropy. The Wavelet Transform extracts the amount of
“detail” exhibited within a signal at various locations over
various levels of resolution [8]. In essence, it transforms a
one-dimensional function of “location” (in our case, file lo-
cation) into a two-dimensional function of “location” and
“scale.” By using the output of the wavelet transform (the
so-called “wavelet coefficients”), it is possible to obtain a se-
ries of coarse-to-fine approximations of an original function.
These successive approximations allow us to determine the
multi-scale structure of the entropy signal, in particular the
“energy” available at different levels of resolution.
For this paper, we apply Haar Wavelets, which is a particu-
larly simple family of wavelets whose members are piecewise
constant. The Haar Wavelet Transform projects the origi-
nal entropy signal onto a collection of piecewise constant
functions which oscillates as a square wave over bounded
support (i.e., the functions assume non-zero values only on
certain bounded intervals). Since these piecewise constant
functions have supports which vary in their scale (width)
and location, the resulting projections describe the “detail”
within the signal at various locations and resolutions.
More specifically, the Haar Wavelet Transform is based upon
the so called “mother function”, ψ(t), defined by:
ψ(t) =

1, t ∈ [0, 1/2)
−1, t ∈ [1/2, 1)
0, otherwise
a very simple step function. Given the Haar mother function
ψ(t), a collection of dyadically scaled and translated wavelet
functions ψj,k(t) are formed by:
ψj,k(t) = 2j/2ψ(2jt− k) (1)
where the integers j, k are scaling parameters. The dilation
parameter j indexes the level of detail or resolution, and the
translation parameter k selects a certain location within the
signal to be analyzed. Note that as the scaling parameter
j increases, the function ψj,k applies to (is non-zero over)
2This paper is a development of earlier research originally
published in conference proceedings [15]. For a more com-
prehensive viewpoint, see [16].
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Figure 1: Examples of Haar wavelet functions. Here we
show some Haar wavelet functions over the unit interval.
Each colored square wave represents (the non-zero part of)
a different wavelet function. The Haar wavelet functions
are defined in Equation 1. In particular, we plot wavelet
functions for resolution levels j = 0, 1, 2 and locations k =
0, .., j. These wavelet functions are used as filters to pick up
the magnitude of entropic change in a piece of software at
different levels of resolution and in different file locations.
successively finer intervals of the signal. Some example Haar
wavelet functions are shown in Figure 1.
Given a signal x(t) where t = 1, . . . , T , we first rescale the
signal so that the first observation occurs at time t = 0 and
the final observation occurs at time t = 1. Then, the so-
called “mother wavelet coefficient” at scale j and location k
is given by the inner product of the signal with the wavelet.
Since we are dealing with discrete signals, the inner product
takes the form:
dj,k =< x,ψj,k >=
T∑
t=1
x(t)ψj,k(t),
One interpretation of this coefficient is that it gives the
(scaled) difference between local averages of the s ignal
across neighboring chunks or bins. The size of the neigh-
boring chunks is determined by the scaling parameter j.
The family of mother wavelet coefficients, {dj,k}, enable a
“Multi-Resolution Analysis” (MRA) of the signal x(t). In
particular, the signal x(t) can be decomposed into a series
of approximations xj(t) , whereby each successive approxi-
mation xj+1(t) is a more detailed refinement of the previous
approximation, xj(t). The functional approximations are
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Figure 2: Wavelet-based functional approximations to a soft-
ware’s entropy signal at different levels of resolution. Here,
we show the entropy signal from a single Portable Exe-
cutable (PE) file projected onto Haar father wavelet space at
different levels of resolution (j ∈ {2, 5, 8} from Equation 2).
In general, each successive functional approximation adds
the incremental detail provided at that level of spatial res-
olution, compared to the next-most-coarse level of spatial
resolution, and does so across various spatial locations.
obtained through the wavelet coefficients by the formula:
xj+1(t) = xj(t) +
2j−1∑
k=0
dj,kψj,k(t) (2)
where x0(t), the coarsest-level functional approximation, is
the mean of the full signal. Thus, the collection of mother
wavelet coefficients {dj,k} store the “details” that allow one
to move from a coarser approximation to a finer approxima-
tion. Examples of successive functional approximations, in
the context of software entropy signals, are shown in Figure
2.
Using the wavelet transform, it is possible to “summarize”
the overall amount of detail in a signal at various levels of
resolution. The total amount of detail at a particular (jth)
level of resolution is known as the energy at that level of
resolution:
Ej =
2j−1∑
k=1
(djk)2 (3)
The distribution of energy across various levels of resolution
is known as an energy spectrum. Note that the energy at
resolution level j is just the squared Euclidean norm of the
vector of mother wavelet coefficients from resolution level
j. After this step, we have reduced the original signal of
size T = 2J (and resultant wavelet vector of size T − 1) to
a vector of J elements, where each element represents the
amount of “energy” at a single level of resolution.
1.4 Wavelet-Based Classifiers
The energy spectra of signals have been very useful features
for classifiers such as neural networks. In fact, this combined
strategy, whereby the coefficients from a discrete wavelet
transform are used as node activations in a neural network,
is referred to as a wavelet neural network (WNN ) strategy
(see e.g. [10], [?]). Using WNN’s, researchers have been able
to automatically classify lung sounds into categories (crack-
les, wheezes, striders, squawks, etc.) [6], to automatically
determine whether brain EEG scans originated from healthy
patients, patients with epilepsy, or patients who were in the
middle of having a seizure [9], or to automatically determine
whether EMG signals collected from the bicep originated
from patients who were healthy, suffering from myopathy,
or suffering from neurogenic disease [4].
We refer to the overall strategy of using wavelet coefficients
as features in a classifier as a Wavelet-Based Classifier strat-
egy. We prefer this term over WNN, which, although well-
established in the literature, is specific to neural network
classifiers. Indeed, in this paper, we choose logistic regres-
sion (both standard and regularized) rather than a neu-
ral network to model our data, because the logistic regres-
sion model provides an atomic analysis of the relationship
between the wavelet-based features and classification cate-
gories.
1.5 Suspiciously Structured Entropic Change
Score (SSECS)
The initial fundamental problem with applying wavelet-
based classifiers to malware analysis is that executable files
out “in the wild” have different lengths. This contrasts
with controlled observational situations, e.g. those described
above, which produce signal samples of fixed length that are
held constant across the data set. In controlled observa-
tional situations, all samples will produce the same number
of features, J, and variation across these set of J features can
be immediately associated with a classification variable in a
straightforward manner, for example by setting the input
layer of the neural network to have J activation notes.
However, in uncontrolled observational contexts, signal
lengths can differ wildly from sample to sample. Imag-
ine, for instance, comparing signal A of length 32 (so
J=5, and if Ef,j represents the energy at resolution level
j = 1, . . . , J for portable executable file f , we would have
Ea,1, . . . , Ea,5) with signal B of length 256 (so J=8, and
we have Eb,1, . . . , Eb,8). How should we compare these two
files?
Our solution to this problem, for smaller data sets3, is to
transform each file’s J-dimensional energy spectrum into a
3A second solution, for larger datasets, is described in Ex-
periment 2.
single scalar feature, a 1-dimensional “Suspiciously Struc-
tured Entropic Change Score” (SSECS). The computation of
SSECS is a two-step process: first, we compute the wavelet-
based energy spectrum of a file’s entropy signal, and second,
we compute the file’s malware propensity score from that en-
ergy spectrum. In our case, we fit a logistic regression model
to the binary classification response (malware or not) which
uses these wavelet energy features as predictor variables. We
fit J separate regression models, one for each file size group-
ing. Given the Energy Spectrum {Ef,j}, which is the set
of wavelet energies for each resolution level j = 1, . . . , J of
portable executable file f , the logistic regression model es-
timates P̂f , the predicted probability that file f is malware,
by the formula
P̂f =
1
1 + exp[−β0 + Ef,j · β(J)]
where β(J)j is a model parameter, known as a “logistic re-
gression coefficient”, from the Jth logistic regression model.
This number, P̂f is what we refer to as the SSECS.
2. EXPERIMENT 1: ANALYZING AND
EVALUATING THE PREDICTIVE PER-
FORMANCE OF A SINGLE WAVELET-
BASED FEATURE
In Experiment 1, we attempt to assess the predictive value of
SSECS as a single feature describing potentially suspicious
variation in software entropy. In particular, as discussed
in Section 2.2, the wavelet-based feature is constructed in
an attempt to describe the “suspiciousness" of a piece of
software’s entropy signal when that entropy signal is re-
represented, through a wavelet transform, in terms of en-
tropic change distributed across different levels of spatial
resolution.
2.1 Data
Data are a set of n=39,968 portable executable files from
a Cylance repository. 19,988 (50.01%) of these files were
known to be malicious, and the remaining files were be-
nign. These files were collected “from the wild," and thus
highly heterogenous. For example, the “malware" category
contains different types of malicious software (e.g. viruses,
Trojan horses, spyware, backdoors, bots, and ransomware –
but not adware.)
2.2 Method
2.2.1 Constructing the entropy stream
To compute the entropy of an executable file, the original
file, represented in hexadecimal (00h-FFh), is split into non-
overlapping chunks of fixed length, typically 256 bytes. For
each chunk of code, the entropy is then computed using the
formula below:
H(c) = −
m∑
i=1
pi(c) log2 pi(c), (4)
where c represents a particular chunk of code, m represents
the number of possible characters (here, n=256), and pi is
the probability (observed frequency) of each character in the
given chunk of code. The entropy for any given chunk then
ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 8.
2.2.2 Computing the Suspiciously Structured En-
tropic Change Score (SSECS)
The procedure for computing the suspiciously structured en-
tropic change score (SSECS) is as follows:
1) Partition data set by size: Group sampled files into j =
{1, . . . , J} groups, where j = blog2T c and T is the length of
the file’s entropy stream:
2) Iterate: For all files which fall into the jth length group
2a) Compute Haar Discrete Wavelet Coefficients: The dis-
crete wavelet transform takes as input a discrete series
of size T = 2J observations. Because the transform re-
quires the series to have a dyadic length, if the number
of observations in the executable file’s entropy stream
is not an integer power of 2, we right-truncate the series
at value 2blog2Tc. The so called “mother” wavelet coef-
ficients, djk, describe the “detail” at successively fine-
grained resolutions. In particular, the mother wavelet
coefficients are indexed such that j ∈ {1, . . . , J} repre-
sents the resolution level, ordered from coarse-grained
to fine-grained, and k ∈ {1, . . . ,K = 2j−1} represents
the particular location (or bin) of the entropy signal
at that resolution level. At each resolution level j, the
signal is divided into Nj = 2j−1 non-overlapping, ad-
jacent bins such that each bin includes Bj = 2J−j ob-
servations. Note that the number of bins, K, increases
as j increases to finer resolutions. The mother wavelet
coefficient at index (k, j) is then given by:
dkj =
1
sj
( 2kBj∑
i=(2k−1)Bj+1
yi −
(2k−1)Bj∑
i=(2k−2)Bj+1
yi
)
(5)
where the scaling factor is sj = (
√
2)J−j+1 and is nec-
essary for the wavelet transform to preserve the size
(norm) of the signal. There are T-1 mother wavelet
coefficients.
2b) Compute Wavelet Energy Spectrum: The wavelet en-
ergy spectrum summarizes the “detail” or “variation”
available at various resolution levels. The energy spec-
trum is computed as a function of the mother wavelet
coefficients, djk. In particular, the “energy”, Ej , of the
entropy stream at the jth resolution level is defined
by Equation 3. Given a particular executable file’s en-
tropy stream, we refer to its distribution of energy over
different resolutions the file’s “energy spectrum.”
2c) Compute Wavelet Energy Suspiciousness: Now we use
the wavelet energy spectrum to determine the “propen-
sity” of each file to be malware (i.e., its suspiciousness).
Computing this propensity requires training. We use
5-fold validation.
2c1) Partition The Current Sample Of Files: Split the
entire set of FJ files which are of the appropriate
size into 5 mutually exclusive subsets F 1J , . . . , F 5J ,
each of which represents exactly 20% of the entire
sample.
2c2) Iterate: For each subset F iJ , where i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
2c2a) Fit a logistic regression : Fit a logistic regres-
sion model on the other four subsets {F kJ : k 6=
i}, where the model fits the class variable (mal-
ware or not) as a function of the wavelet energy
spectrum. The logistic regression model will
produce a set of beta coefficients to weigh the
strength of each resolution energy on the file’s
probability of being malware.
2c2b) Calculate malware propensity: Use the logistic
regression model above to then make a predic-
tion about files in subset F iJ . In particular, use
the model learned in step 1c2a to calculate the
predicted probability that each file in set F iJ
is malware, given its wavelet energy spectrum.
This malware propensity (i.e., predicted mal-
ware probability) lies within the interval [0, 1],
and is what we call the Suspiciously Structured
Entropic Change Score (SSECS).
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Suspicious Patterns of Entropic Change in A
Single File Size Group
How does the model transform these wavelet energy spec-
tra into predictions about whether the file is malware (that
is, into a Suspiciously Structured Entropic Change Score)?
To illustrate, we consider the subset of n=1,599 files in our
corpus belonging to file size group J = 5. Because these
files can be analyzed at J = 5 different spatial resolutions,
we extract 5 features from each file, with each feature rep-
resenting the energy at one level of spatial resolution in the
file’s entropy stream.
For illustrative purposes, we begin by analyzing the wavelet
energy spectrum for two files from this size category, as
they embody more general trends in the energy patterns of
malicious versus clean files. Figure 3 shows wavelet-based
functional approximations for two different entropy streams.
The left column of the plot depicts the entropy signal from
File A, which is legitimate software, whereas the right col-
umn of the plot depicts the entropy signal from File B, which
is malware. Reading these columns from top to bottom,
we see that the wavelet transform produces successively de-
tailed functional approximations to these files’ entropy sig-
nals. The title above each subplot shows the wavelet energy,
as computed in Equation (3) in the text, of the signal at
a particular spatial resolution level. The wavelet energy is
simply the sum of the squares of the scaled differences in the
mean entropy levels, where the differences are only taken be-
tween even/odd index pairings (i.e. the algorithm takes the
differences meanbin2−meanbin1,meanbin4−meanbin3, and
so forth). Thus, we can gain some visual intuition about
how the energy spectra can be derived from these successive
functional approximations.
Based on this entropic energy spectrum decomposition (or
distribution of energy across various levels of spatial resolu-
tion), the model believes that File A is legitimate software,
whereas File B is malware. Investigating this conclusion,
we see that these two files have radically different wavelet
energy distributions across the 5 levels of spatial resolution.
The legitimate software (File A) has its “entropic energy”
mostly concentrated at finer levels of resolution, whereas the
piece of malware (File B) has its “entropic energy” mostly
concentrated at coarser levels of resolution. For the clean
file, the energy in the entropy stream is concentrated at the
resolution levels j = 4 and j = 5 (where the energy is 34.5
and 23.84 squared bits, respectively). For the dirty file, the
energy in the entropy signal is concentrated at coarser levels
of analysis, peaking especially strongly at level j = 2 (where
the energy is 139.99 squared bits).
The fit of the logistic regression model (for both raw and
normalized features) is summarized in Table 1. Note that
for the entire table, numbers outside the parentheses repre-
sent results for the normalized features, whereas numbers in-
side the parentheses represent results for raw features. The
two “Energy” columns list the energy at all five levels of
spatial resolution for these two files. The “Value of βj”
column describes the estimated beta weight in a logistic re-
gression fitting file maliciousness to the five wavelet energy
values, based on a corpus of n=1,599 files. The “P-value”
column describes the probability of getting the test statis-
tic we observed (not shown, it is a function of the data)
under the hypothesis that there is no relationship between
energy at that level and file maliciousness. The codes are:
∗ = p < .05, ∗∗ = p < .01, ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < .001, ∗ ∗ ∗∗ = p <
.0001, ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ = p < .00001. The “Malware Sensitivity”
represents the estimated change in the odds that a file is
malware associated with an increase of one unit in the cor-
responding feature. It is calculated by (eβ − 1) × 100%.
For the normalized values (those outside the parenthesis),
an increase of one unit refers to an increase of one standard
deviation.
Based on these logistic regression beta weight (βj) values,
we see that the two sample files from Figure 3 are indeed
representative of a larger trend: having high energy at spa-
tial resolution levels 1,2 and 3 (the coarser levels) is asso-
ciated with a higher probability of the file being malware
(since those βj ’s are positive), whereas having high energy
at levels 4 and 5 (the finer levels) is associated with a lower
probability of the file being malicious (since those βj ’s are
negative). Moreover, these associations appears to be re-
flective of trends in the larger population of files, since the
p-values are largely strongly statistically significant. This
finding makes sense if artificial encryption and compression
tactics tend to elevate moderate to large sized chunks of
malicious files into high entropy states.
2.3.2 Suspicious Patterns of Entropic Change Across
All File Size Groups
Do the trends found in the single level analysis of n = 1, 599
files hold up in the full corpus of n = 39, 968 files? In par-
ticular, regardless of file size, can we corroborate the sim-
ply stated conclusion that “malware tends to concentrate
entropic energy at relatively coarse levels of spatial resolu-
tion?” And if so, where is the dividing line between “coarse”
and “fine”?
In Figure 4, we summarize the results of logistic regres-
sion models fits across all file size groupings. The plot
shows logistic regression beta coefficients for determining
the probability that a portable executable file is malware
based upon the magnitude of file’s entropic energy at var-
ious levels of spatial resolution within the code. Positive
betas (red colors) mean that higher “entropic energy” at
that resolution level is associated with a greater probability
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Figure 3: Wavelet-based functional approximations, and the corresponding wavelet energy spectrum, for the entropy signals
of two representative portable executable files from one file size group.
Resolution Energy Spectra Statistical Model For F ile Size J = 5
Level # Bins Bin Size F ile A File B V alue of βj P − value Malware Sensitivity
1 2 16 -0.39 (4.35) -0.01 (14.44) 0.448 (0.017) ***** +56.5% (+1.7%)
2 4 8 -0.79 (0.80) 6.27 (139.99) 0.174 (0.008) * +19.0% (+0.89%)
3 8 4 -0.48 (5.29) 2.18 (53.83) 0.847 (0.046) ***** +133.2% (+4.74%)
4 16 2 1.42 (34.50) -0.37 (9.75) -0.106 (-0.008) n.s. -10.0% (-0.75%)
5 32 1 1.77 (23.84) 1.19 (19.22) -0.240 (-0.030) ** -21.4% (-2.99%)
Table 1: Investigating the relationship between the entropic wavelet energy spectrum and maliciousness for files in one size
group.
of being malware. Negative betas (blue colors) mean that
higher “entropic energy” at that resolution level is associated
with a lower probability of being malware. For both colors,
stronger intensities represent stronger magnitudes of the re-
lationship between entropic energy and malware. Mathe-
matically, the dot product between a file’s energy spectrum
and these beta weights determine the fitted probability that
the file is malicious. Thus, the Danger Map interpretation
can be interpreted as follows: For any file size grouping (or
row), files that have high energies in the red spots and low
energies in the blue spots are significantly more likely to be
“dangerous.” Conversely, files that have low energies in the
red spots and high energies in the red spots are significantly
more likely to be “safe.”
Taking this Danger Map into consideration, we draw the
following conclusions:
• To a first approximation, the full analysis supports
the “coarse-energy-is-bad, fine-energy-is-good” mantra
(observed in Section 2.3.1’s analysis of a single file-size
group). Visually, most diagonal elements of the matrix
are blue (and also more blue than the off-diagonals).
Thus, across most file sizes, high energies at the finest-
level of spatial resolution appear to be indicative of file
legitimacy, and high energies at coarse levels of spatial
resolution are often associated with suspiciousness.
• However, what qualifies as a suspicious pattern in the
wavelet decomposition of a file’s entropy stream ap-
pears to be more complex than the simplistic sum-
mary above. For example, the appearance of the dou-
ble diagonal bands in blue suggest somewhat regular
vacillations in terms of how “suspicious” high entropic
energy would look at various levels of spatial resolu-
tion. We find that the particular patterning depicted
in the Danger Map provides a statistically significantly
better description of malware than random (baseline-
informed) guessing alone. Likelihood ratio tests com-
paring the fit of the size-specific models (where the
beta coefficients of each size-specific model are given
by the specific colorings in the corresponding row of
the Danger Map) versus the fit of models with no fea-
tures (interpretable as a uniform color across rows,
where the intensity of the color is determined by base-
line malware rates, independent of the wavelet energy
spectrum) yield the test statistics below. Moving from
bottom (J=3) to top (J=15) of the figure, we have:
χ
2(3) = 198.36, χ2(4) = 563.51, χ2(5) = 257.52,
χ
2(6) = 235.09, χ2(7) = 150.11, χ2(8) = 585.57,
χ
2(9) = 662.22, χ2(10) = 283.24, χ2(11) = 385.33,
χ
2(12) = 305.04, χ2(13) = 233.39, χ2(14) = 116.17,
χ
2(15) = 61.88,
All of these test statistics achieve statistical signifi-
cance at the α = .05 level. Moreover, even after a
conservative Bonferroni’s correction for simultaneous
hypothesis testing (of 10 null hypotheses), we can still
reject the null hypothesis of a uniform color across
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Figure 4: A “Danger Map" for entropy patterns within a
piece of software. The danger map is derived from a statis-
tical model of malware classification which learns suspicious
patterns inherent within each software’s entropy streams. In
particular, a wavelet decomposition of these entropy streams
reveals the entropic energy at various levels of resolution.
The plot shows logistic regression beta coefficients for de-
termining the probability that a portable executable file is
malware based upon the magnitude of file’s entropic energy
at various levels of resolution within the code.
rows for each spatial resolution except spatial resolu-
tion level 9. This finding suggests that the distribution
of colors in the “Danger Map" of Figure 4, while not
sufficiently simplistic to be easily verbalizable, is un-
likely to be obtainable by random chance.4
2.4 Predictive performance of the single
wavelet feature
How can we use the information distributed across the “Dan-
ger Map” to construct a single number which could score a
piece of software’s suspiciousness based on the wavelet de-
composition of its entropy signal? We studied the predictive
performance of SSECS in identifying malware by construct-
ing a hold-out test set of n = 7, 991 files and found:
1. SSECS as a single feature improved predictions of mal-
ware, within a balanced sample of malware and legit-
imate software, from 50% to 68.7% accuracy. This
makes SSECS a particularly impressive feature, con-
sidering that most machine learning models of malware
consist of millions of features.
4 We reject the null hypothesis that the colors in each row
are uniform, and this rejection is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that the complex patterns of colors are meaningful in
predicting malware. However, we point out for the sake of
completion that this finding is also consistent with simpler
but more specific hypotheses, such as that the right-most
off-diagonal cell is driving the result. Ideally, a more so-
phisticated statistical model, well-tailored to the structure
of a multi-resolution dataset, would be applied here to tease
apart these remaining possibilities.
2. SSECS provides predictive information beyond what
is contained in a mean entropy feature. A model
with mean entropy as a single feature achieved 66.2%
predictive accuracy. Thus, mean entropy is indeed
also an impressive single predictor of malware (per-
haps not surprisingly given its prevalence in the liter-
ature). However, unlike mean entropy, the wavelet en-
ergy spectrum detects suspicious patterns of entropic
change across the code of the executable file. We found
that a 2-feature model which includes both mean en-
tropy and SSECS achieves 73.3% predictive accuracy
(so adding wavelet-based information to the model
yields a 7.1% boost in predictive accuracy beyond what
is obtained by mean entropy alone).
3. SSECS provides predictive information beyond what is
contained in a “standard deviation of entropy" feature.
A skeptic might ask: why not simply use standard
deviation, a more commonly used and more computa-
tionally straightforward measure of variation? Stan-
dard deviation is useful, but a relatively cruder mea-
sure of variation, as it operates on only a single spatial
scale. Indeed, a 2-feature model which includes both
mean entropy and standard deviation achieves merely
70.4% predictive accuracy.
3. EXPERIMENT 2: LARGER-SCALE DE-
TECTION OF PARASITIC MALWARE
In Experiment 1, we evaluated the predictive value of a sin-
gle wavelet-based feature that describes how software’s en-
tropic shifts are distributed across multiple spatial scales.
We found that this feature can exploit valuable information
from a software’s entropy signal which is relevant to mal-
ware status and which goes beyond the predictive value of
the most commonly used entropy measures, mean entropy,
as well as a potentially conceptually simpler measure of en-
tropy variation, entropy standard deviation. In Experiment
2, we apply a broader system of wavelet-based features to
a larger-scale malware prediction task. In particular, the
task is to identify parasitic malware from a large corpus of
otherwise good files. Parasitic malware generally infects ex-
isting files on a user’s system, and the infected part of the
file typically conceals itself through encryption or compres-
sion. Thus, if wavelet decomposition of software entropy
indeed yields features which successfully track the presence
of suspicious chunks of encrypted or compressed code, then
these features should be particularly valuable for a parasitic
detection task.
3.1 Data
Data were 699,121 samples of Portable Executable (PE)
files from a Cylance repository. Of these samples, 17,605
files (2.51%) were parasitic malware, and the remaining files
were legitimate software. We randomly selected 80% of the
dataset for training, and the remaining 20% were allocated
to the test set.
3.2 Method
To validate the utility of wavelet features in distinguishing
parasitic malware from clean software, we compared four
models (in the sense of types of features extracted from ex-
ecutable files to feed into a machine learning classifier):
1. Strings Model: A strings-only model is a common way
to build features for a machine learning classifier [13].
Thus, we extract the P1 = 1, 117, 127 most common
strings observed in our corpus and use them as binary
features in a predictive model.
2. Strings+Wavelet Model: We would like to investigate
if wavelet-based features can add predictive value to
a strings only model. Because of the relatively large-
scale size of the dataset (≈ 20× the size of Exper-
iment 1), we streamline the feature generation pro-
cess. Rather than computing SSECS, the energy spec-
trum suspiciousness score, which requires a nested
modeling step, we follow the feature generation algo-
rithm of Section 2.2 only up to Step 2.2.2, computing
the wavelet energy spectrum. We then represent the
wavelet energy spectrum separately for each file size
group. In particular, a sample with T points in its
entropy stream will have J = blog2 T c features in its
wavelet energy spectrum. If Jmax is the maximum
observed value of J in the dataset, then there are∑Jmax
J=1 J =
Jmax(Jmax + 1)
2 features, where any given
sample with T points in its entropy stream will only
have non-zero values for J = blog2 T c of these features
(namely, for the part of the vector that corresponds
to its filesize group). Although obviously this proce-
dure creates a huge proliferation of features relative
to the single SSECS feature studied in Experiment 1,
the procedure is more informative and becomes more
feasible as more data is collected, while simultaneously
streamlining the modeling pipeline for larger datasets.
Finally, we bin the wavelet energy spectrum features,
which are originally continuous, to create a sparse bi-
nary dataset. In this way, we obtain 24,009 binary fea-
tures derived from the wavelet energy spectrum. Af-
ter adding in the strings as well, the Strings+Wavelet
model includes P2 = 1, 141, 136 binary features.
3. Strings+Entropy+Wavelet Model: The wavelet fea-
tures capture some information about the entropy sig-
nal, but it is incomplete. For example, the wavelet
energy spectrum describes variation at multiple lev-
els of resolution, but ignores first-order information
(i.e., measures of central tendency, such as the mean).
Thus, in an attempt to construct a more powerful pre-
dictive model from strings and the entropy signal, here
we add simple summary statistics about the entropy
signal: mean, standard deviation, signal-to-noise ra-
tio, maximum entropy, percentage of the signal with
“high” entropy (≥ 6.5 bits), percentage of the signal
with zero entropy, and length and squared length of
the signal. As these supplementary entropy features
are relatively simple to compute, we obtain these mea-
surements separately for each PE section. As these
features are also continuous, they are then binned
through an internal binning process to create a sparse
binary dataset. This procedure creates 108,835 ad-
ditional features to add to the strings model (24,009
derived from the wavelet energy spectrum, and 84,826
other entropy features). All together, this model con-
tains P3 = 1, 225, 962 binary features.
4. Strings+Entropy Model: In order to provide a more
rigorous test of the value of the wavelet features,
we create a fourth model which includes strings
and the summary entropy features described above,
but no wavelet features. Our reasoning is that,
even if the wavelet features improve the strings-
only model, this improvement could, in theory, have
been merely driven by the inclusion of some en-
tropy information (or even file length). By construct-
ing this model, we can compare the performance of
the Strings+Entropy+Wavelet model with the per-
formance of the Strings+Entropy model to answer
the question: do wavelet features provide additional
predictive information that goes above and beyond
the information inherent in summary entropy statis-
tics (mean, max standard deviation, etc.)? Thus,
this model includes the 84,826 summary entropy fea-
tures, but not the wavelet features. All together,
with the string features as well, this model contains
P4 = 1, 201, 953 features.
Because we have a large number of predictors (up to Pmax =
1, 225, 962) relative to samples (N = 699, 121), we apply
a “logistic lasso" model (i.e. `1-penalized logistic regres-
sion) to perform classification and feature selection simul-
taneously. Similarly to unregularized logistic regression, we
can use the learned regression (or beta) weights as a proxy
for feature importance. Since the features are all binary,
each βj , j = 1, . . . , P can be interpreted as the increase in
log odds that the file is malware which is associated with the
jth feature “turning on" (i.e. flipping from 0 to 1) and all
other features staying constant. Thus, features with large
positive (respectively, negative) beta weights can be consid-
ered particularly strong predictors of goodness (respectively,
badness). In the results section, we explore properties of the
most “influential" features, defined as the collection of 100
features with the largest positive weights and 100 features
with the largest negative weights. As our purpose in this
paper is to compare the effect of different feature subsets on
predictive performance, and not to explore the predictive
benefits of varying levels of sparsity in feature selection, we
simply fix the sparsity parameter to 1.0.
3.3 Results and Discussion
In Figure 5 and Table 2, we compare the performance of the
logistic lasso parasitic malware classifier using datasets with
and without wavelet features. In particular, the ROC curves
in Fig. 5 graphically depict performance results across a
range of decision thresholds, and Table 2 highlights numeri-
cal results at particular samples of the ROC curves. The left
hand column of Table 2 shows the hit rate of the model, and
the right hand column shows the correct rejection rate. Each
pair of rows in Table 2 can be seen as providing concrete
values for samples of points from the ROC curves in Fig.
5, where the rows for each pair represent samples from the
blue and red curves which have nearly aligned x-coordinates.
Thus, each pair of rows describes the effect of adding wavelet
features at roughly comparable tolerances for risking a false
positive.
The wavelet features improved the string-only model’s abil-
ity to detect parasitics while simultaneously reducing false
positives. The effect of wavelet features on detection was
fairly strong for most false positive rates. For example,
for false positive rates around one-third of one percent,
the wavelet features boosted detection of parasitic malware
from 80.90% to 82.97% despite only adding ∼24k features
to the original corpus of ∼1.1 million strings. Moreover,
Fig 5. (right plot) reveals that inclusion of wavelet features
boosted the parasitic detection performance of a strings-
plus-entropy model in a fairly pronounced way as well. For
false positive rates around .02-.03%, detection of parasitic
malware jumped from 92.10% to 94.27%. For false posi-
tive rates around .77-.79%, detection of parasitic malware
jumped from 98.63% to 98.90%. These results in Fig. 5
(right side) reinforce the conclusion of Experiment 1, we
find that the wavelet features capture information that goes
beyond more pedestrian entropy-based information (mean,
max, standard deviation, etc.). Overall, these results sug-
gest that the wavelet energy spectrum extracted from the
entropy signal of an executable file provides a useful set of
features for a machine learning model for automatically de-
tecting parasitic malware. Moreover, the predictive value of
these features seems to not be redundant with other, simpler
summary features derivable from the entropy signal.
In Table 3, we report some additional results about
the most influential features in the various mod-
els. In the strings-only model, we found that
the 100 most influential strings in terms of push-
ing the model towards a parasitics classification in-
cluded examples such as: CreateKernelThread, Tram-
poline, FreeAllBuffers, VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV-
VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV, UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU-
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU, SetProcessPriorityBoost,
CreateProcessA, and ! Best regards 2 Tommy
Salo 002E [Nov-2005] yours [Dziadulja Apanas]. For the
strings+wavelet model, we see that even though the wavelet
features comprise a relatively small proportion (2.1%) of
the strings+wavelet model, they constitute a relatively large
proportion (7.0%) of that model’s set of influential features.
From an adversarial point of view, it is a nice finding that
wavelet-based features can displace some of the importance
of strings, as it is presumably easier for an evasive mal-
ware writer to alter a suggestive string such as Trampo-
line (the string is suspicious as it evokes derivatives of
the state-sponsored Stuxnet parasitic worm) than to dis-
place an entropic energy spectral configuration in a direc-
tion favored by a machine learning model. Finally, in the
strings+wavelet+entropy model, wavelet features were also
disproportionately influential on the final classification; they
were about 2.5 times more likely to be influential features
than would have been predicted based on their overall preva-
lence in the feature corpus alone.
4. GRAND DISCUSSION
All together, wavelet decompositions on software entropy
seem to be useful for malware prediction tasks by captur-
ing the degree to which a portable executable file exhibits
suspicious patterns of shifting entropy within its byte-level
code. In particular, we considered the problem that certain
kinds of malware (e.g. parasitic malware) tend to contain
chunks of encrypted and compressed code embedded in an
otherwise normal looking executable file. To address this
situation, we applied a wavelet decomposition to each file’s
entropy stream so as to obtain each file’s entropic wavelet
energy spectrum. The entropic wavelet energy spectrum
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Figure 5: Performance boost on parasitic malware detection task caused by adding wavelet-based features to two different
baseline feature processing methods. Performance here was measured as accuracy by a logistic lasso classifier on a hold-out
test set of software samples.
Predictive Accuracy (Test Set)
Model Parasitic Malware Clean Software
Strings 80.90% 99.64%
Strings+Wavelet 82.97% 99.65%
Strings+Entropy 92.10 % 99.97%
Strings+Entropy+Wavelet 94.27 % 99.98%
Strings+Entropy 98.63% 99.19%
Strings+Entropy+Wavelet 98.90 % 99.23%
Table 2: Wavelet-based decompositions of software entropy boosts performance on a parasitic malware detection task. The
left hand column shows the hit rate of the model, and the right hand column shows the correct rejection rate. Each pair of
rows show the numerical values for points that form approximate vertical slices through the red and blue ROC curves in Fig.
5. That is, each pair of rows compares hit rates on parasitic malware for approximately equal false positive rates on clean
software.
Contribution of Wavelet Features
Model % of All Features % of Influential Features
Strings+Wavelet 2.10% 7.00%
Strings+Entropy+Wavelet 1.96% 4.50%
Table 3: Wavelet-based features are disproportionately likely to be influential features. As defined in Section 3.2, influential
features have a particularly strong impact on the machine learning model’s classification.
characterizes how a file distributes entropic change across
multiple levels of spatial resolution. In the first study, we
found that a single feature derived from wavelet decomposi-
tions of software entropy can yield valuable predictive infor-
mation in a heterogeneous corpus of malware. In the second
study, we found that features derived from the wavelet de-
compositions boosted performance on a large-scale parasitic
malware detection task, and that a classifier built solely on
three types of features (strings+entropy+wavelet) can pro-
duce excellent predictive performance. In both studies, we
found that the information provided by wavelet decomposi-
tions of software entropy is not merely redundant with more
common measures such as mean entropy or standard devia-
tion of the entropy.
Future research relating wavelet decompositions to malware
classification in machine learning tasks might consider any
of the following goals:
1. Exploit predictive value from information about the
location of entropic change (perhaps as pointers for
extracting further information about those parts of the
file). This location of entropic change is provided in
the mother wavelet coefficients across which we have
marginalized to obtain the wavelet energy spectrum.
2. Apply a more powerful classifier, such as a deep-
learning neural network, which could consider more
complicated interactions between features when mod-
eling the response. In addition, incorporate other
classes of features (n-grams [7], statistical functions
of n-grams [14], etc.) What kinds of features interact
usefully with the wavelet energy spectrum in predict-
ing malware, and what can we learn from that about
the existing corpus of parasitic malware?5
3. Investigate the potential utility of non-entropic
wavelet energy spectra from byte-level representations
of executable files. Indeed, entropy streams are just
one possible example of real-valued streams derivable
from byte-level file content (see e.g. [14]), and wavelet
energy spectra can be extracted from any real-valued
function on the raw bytes.
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